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Afterword. On Region and Nation
Sanjay Subrahmanyam
1 Geography, the Greek philosopher and geographer Strabo (d. 24 CE) is alleged to have
thought,  was Destiny.  Many major political  thinkers have disputed this  claim in one
fashion or another over the past some centuries. In his celebrated lecture entitled Qu’est-
ce qu’une nation?, delivered in Paris in March 1882, Ernest Renan (1823-1892) declared:
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which, properly speaking, are
really one and the same constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past,
the  other  is  the  present.  One  is  the  possession  in  common  of  a  rich  legacy  of
memories; the other is present consent, the desire to live together, the desire to
continue to invest in the heritage that we have jointly received. (Renan 1992 [1882])
2 Speaking only about a decade after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, and heavily
aware of other arguments on nationhood being made across the border (by the followers
of Fichte, for example), Renan also declared: 
Man is a slave neither of his race, his language, his religion, the course of his rivers,
nor the direction of his mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, in sane mind
and warm heart, created a moral conscience that calls itself a nation. As long as this
moral conscience tests its strength by sacrifices that require the subordination of
the individual to the communal good, it is legitimate and has the right to exist. If
doubts  are  raised  along  the  frontiers,  consult  the  disputed  populations.  They
certainly have a right to express their views on the matter. (Renan 1992 [1882])
3 Nation in this view then was neither natural nor inevitable, nor indeed flowing from
geography and ethnicity; rather it was something based, as it were, on elective affinities,
akin perhaps to a marriage built on romantic love. As for the people on the frontier, they
were perhaps comparable to the children divided in a fraught marriage.
4 Renan did not write in a world of nations, but rather one where the nation-state as a
‘modular form’ was only beginning to emerge fully into its own. On the other hand, the
twentieth century, which began as a period when the world was still  dominated by a
series  of  empires—British,  French,  German,  Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman,  Qing  and
Russian—ended,  as is  well-known, with the nation-state as its  dominant political  and
sovereign form. Indeed, the second half of the century saw a veritable explosion in the
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number of nation-states the world over. The United Nations, which at its foundation in
1945 only had some 51 nation-states as members, had as many as 80 by 1956, then 122 by
1966  (largely  on  account  of  African  decolonization),  147  in  1976,  a  small  further
expansion to 159 by 1986, thereafter a major push to 185 in 1996 (essentially due to the
collapse and disaggregation of the Soviet bloc), and eventually had reached the number of
192 by 2006. This progressive overall proliferation of nations was accompanied, curiously
enough, by a scholarly production which regularly proclaimed that the nation-state as a
form was obsolete and doomed, especially on account of large and levelling forces such as
‘globalization’,  or the extreme neo-liberal dream of the ‘end of history’.  But if  ‘world
government’ was the notional telos, there were few proponents of a road-map of how this
would in fact come about. The UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, had already had
as many as 58 members at its height in the mid-1930s. A substantial number of these were
what could be called post-imperial nations, having emerged either from the break-up of
the Spanish empire (largely in the 1810s and 1820s), or that of the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian empires  in  the  immediate  aftermath of  World  War  I.  Again,  of  the  ‘new’
nations that were born after 1945, a very great number came out of the debris of empires,
in particular the European colonial empires in Asia and Africa. Their logic was varied and
complex. Some referred above all to ideas of ethnicity in order to define their limits;
others harked back to administrative divisions that had existed under colonial rule; and
still others drew above all on religious distinctions. If the borders between some used
precisely the natural  divisions such as rivers,  lakes and mountain ranges that Renan
decried, in other cases the frontiers were apparently made using a simple ruler and pencil
on a map, often in the context of earlier inter-imperial rivalries. The current frontiers of
Mali and Namibia are interesting examples of this phenomenon, but by no means the only
ones.
5 Almost all of these nation-states have had ideologues, proclaiming (unlike Renan) their
inevitable and ‘natural’, and even near-eternal, character. Yet, the historian is usually
struck, quite on the contrary, by the highly contingent character of the processes that
permitted these  states  to  emerge.  We may take the case  of  Spanish America,  where
decolonization initially led to the formation, amongst other significant entities, of the
state of Gran Colombia, under the leadership of Simón Bolívar between roughly 1819 and
1831. This state, which emerged from the Spanish viceroyalty of Nueva Granada (that had
itself been created in the first half of the eighteenth century) and also used its rough
boundaries, eventually was dissolved on account of internecine disputes to produce the
separate states of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama, which have existed ever
since. Yet,  should we see this process of fragmentation as inevitable, rather than the
product of difficult negotiations between fractious elites and their larger followings? Had
Bolívar himself not had excessive centralizing ambitions, bordering on the dictatorial,
and also not wished to push the physical limits of this state further, and well into the
Andes, could Gran Colombia not have held together in some form and thus provided a
more substantial bulwark against the ambitions of the United States, and the ‘doctrine’ of
its  President  James  Monroe  (1817-1825)  in  the  region?  These  questions  may  not  be
entirely absurd. After all, in 1830, even the limits of the United States itself, which was
sometimes  apt  to  use  the  providentialist  language  of  ‘manifest  destiny’  by  the  mid-
nineteenth century to justify its own westward expansion, were far from being set in
stone. In sum, the relationship between region and nation is anything but self-evident to
the modern historian, and is itself the centre of ongoing debates.
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6 The collection of essays to which this brief text serves as an afterword emerged from a
day-long meeting held in November 2012 at the Centre d’Etudes de l’Inde et de l’Asie du
Sud (or CEIAS) in Paris. Its subsequent evolution as a collective enterprise has been briefly
explained in the introduction, and involved both an expansion in the themes treated, and
a modification, so to speak, in the cast of characters. However, from the very outset, the
intention of the organizers was to open up the conversation beyond the now all-too-
familiar revisiting of the dyad of India and Pakistan. This is how a key section of the
initial statement for the meeting ran.
South Asia, another name for the Indian Subcontinent, is a recent concept (only
about six decades old), forged outside the region in the wake of the establishment
of  area  studies  by  American  universities.  While  it  may  be  preferred  to  Indian
subcontinent for its political neutrality, it is nonetheless a contested concept, both
externally  and  internally.  Whether  in  South  Asia  itself  or  in  international
institutions or research centres outside the region, there is no general consensus
about the countries the concept encompasses: it primarily refers to India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh,  Sri  Lanka, Nepal,  Bhutan, the Maldives,  as per the definition of the
SAARC, which has however included Afghanistan lately (2005) among its members.
Some would also include Burma (Myanmar) as it was a province of British India till
1937.  Internally,  the  concept  is  contested  on  the  political  level  but  in  a  fairly
paradoxical way: on the one hand, as a concept closely associated with India, it is in
some  contexts  rejected  by  its  neighbours;  on  the  other  hand,  neighbouring
countries (especially Nepal and Sri Lanka) have been instrumental in making the
concept  exist  through  the  creation  of  journals,  associations,  and  websites  that
mobilise the term.
7 At the same time, it was clear both to the organizers and to the other participants that a
problem of asymmetry, or considerably unequal weight, existed when all these national
entities were set side-by-side. On the one hand, there was the Indian behemoth, and on
the other, countries such as Nepal and Sri Lanka, which barely measured up—whether in
terms of demography or economy—to one of the Indian provinces. This, for example, is
how the demographic comparison looks in the baldest terms. 
 
Table: Comparative Demography of South Asia, ca. 2012





Sri Lanka 21.33 1.3
Bhutan 0.76  
Maldives 0.35  
TOTAL 1662 100.0
   
Afterword. On Region and Nation
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 10 | 2014
3
Afghanistan 31.28  
Myanmar 53.72  
TOTAL 1747  
Source: http://data.worldbank.org
8 This is a level of disproportion that is considerably more extreme than many of the other
salient cases of regional hegemons: the United States in the context of North America, or
Russia in relation to Eastern Europe. Mexico’s population, for example, is today around
120 million compared to a US population of around 316 million,  greater than a third;
Ukraine has a population of 45 million in comparison to 143 million for Russia. It is only
in East Asia that one finds a similar situation to that in South Asia, with South Korea
(50 million), North Korea (25 million), and Japan (127 million), providing a relatively slim
counterweight  to  China  (1350 million),  although  the  economic  importance  of  Japan
exceeds its demographic weight by some margin.
9 If these macro-regions of the world are thus internally constituted quite differently today
in terms of geopolitics, their histories do share something, especially in the centuries
after 1600. East Asia can be seen as being in fair measure heir to the political tradition of
the Qing (or Manchu) dynasty, founded in the 1640s, and its at-times difficult coexistence
with  the  Tokugawa shogunate  and the  Korean Chosŏn dynasty;  the  political  map of
eastern Europe emerged from a complex negotiation with the processes of Tsarist and
Habsburg expansionism; and North America was formed in the crucible of the struggle for
power between the Spanish and British empires (with the French in a tertiary role). In
South Asia, again, the long-term legacy of an early modern empire weighs heavy, and it is
that of the Mughals (or Indian Timurids), who emerged out of Central Asia and dominated
the  area  between  the  mid-sixteenth  and  the  mid-eighteenth  century,  but  formally
continued to be present there as a dynasty as late as 1857-1858. The geographical limits of
Mughal power extended, at its height, from Kabul and Qandahar in the north-west, to the
Brahmaputra valley and the Chittagong Hills in the east, and from Kashmir in the far
north to Mysore and Tanjavur in the extreme south. Significantly, at least two parts of
South Asia fell outside the Mughal ambit, and these were Kerala and Sri Lanka, of which
the Mughals were quite well aware, but never seem to have coveted in their imperial
ambitions.
10 Can we think of South Asia then as an entity with strong ‘natural boundaries’, which lend
it a certain stability as a macro-region in world history? If the Himalayas on the one hand,
and the Indian Ocean on the other,  support this thesis,  both the north-west and the
north-east  suggest  a  fair  greater  degree  of  porosity.  These  were  also  areas  of  failed
Mughal  expansion;  their  campaigns  against  the  Ahom  kingdom  were  prolonged  but
ultimately unsuccessful, and the campaign under Shah Jahan in the 1640s to take the area
of Balkh, and make a claim to the southern part of Central Asia (the Mughal ancestral
watan), also failed. But a close examination of their histories shows that these failures
were  not  entirely  inevitable,  and  might  also  have  eventually  produced  a  different
geopolitics. It was only the consolidation of the British Empire in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, and the slow and painful definition of frontiers that followed,
that actually set clearer limits to what we think of now as South Asia. It has often been
Afterword. On Region and Nation
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 10 | 2014
4
erroneously claimed that the British were solely responsible for producing the ‘idea of
India’;  it  is  possible,  on the other hand,  to defend the view that the British in their
dealings with the Qing dynasty and Tsarist Russia eventually produced at least two rough
boundary-lines to complete a sense of South Asia. Further, even the consolidation of the
Nepal  kingdom  as  a  stable  political  entity  dates  precisely  to  this  moment  of  the
emergence of British hegemony, effectively culminating with the Anglo-Nepalese War of
1814-1816, which shrank that kingdom’s borders to more-or-less its present limits (and
which thus remains a matter of ongoing resentment in some circles).1
11 There is thus plenty of evidence to show how national boundaries as they exist today in
South Asia are artificial and contingent, and the consequence of both deliberate political
acts and more inchoate political processes.  Even fervent Indian nationalists implicitly
admit this when they dedicate a cult to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875-1950), who they
sometimes refer to as the ‘Indian Bismarck’. Among Patel’s more notorious actions was
the mounting of ‘Operation Polo’, the military intervention in September 1948 to bring
the Nizamat of Hyderabad into the Indian Union. Estimates of the deaths in this ‘police
action’ (as it was euphemistically termed) range from thirty to forty thousand at the
lower  end,  to  as  many  as  200,000  at  the  upper  end.  Perhaps  a  geographical  logic
eventually would have dictated the incorporation of Hyderabad into India, but geography
often provides no real answers to the directions or ends of such processes. The enduring
dispute over the region of Kashmir, which is now nearly in its seventh decade, has over
that period cost a far larger number of lives than the relatively pointed intervention in
the Deccan. As in the case of Palestine, which the British pulled out of and partitioned at
roughly the same time as South Asia, it has thus turned out to be extremely difficult (if
not entirely impossible) to establish stable national boundaries in South Asia even over
an extended time-span. In both these instances, therefore, some theory of ‘incomplete
territorial  sovereignty’  as  an enduring feature may be necessary,  rather than a view
where the emergence of the nation as a stable entity is inevitable.
12 In a recent and more-or-less persuasive essay on the question, entitled How India Became
Territorial  (2014),  political  scientist  and  international  relations  theorist  Itty  Abraham
points  to how internal  compulsions and external  drives (the latter  to be understood
under the broad head of ‘foreign policy’) have closely interacted in the past decades to
produce an Indian national state that ‘is hostile to the provision of equal citizenship’ and
based on the creation of ‘a hierarchical political community that defines minorities as
social collectives of lower standing.’ Abraham is concerned to break down the convention
that  separates  questions  of  borders  and  ‘international  relations’,  from  the  internal
politics  of  nations,  as  well  as  question  the  fraught  relationship  between nation  and
national diaspora. As is well-known, the Indian diaspora in the West (and especially in
North  America)  has  played  a  significant  role  in  ideological  terms  in  the  past  three
decades, including in sharpening tensions between India and its neighbours and has also
contributed  to  pushing  forward  the  agenda  of  hindutva.  Yet,  concluding  his  work,
Abraham returns to a familiar left-wing trope. He writes: ‘The prevailing tendency of the
international community has been to affirm how important it is for global order not to
challenge  or  overturn  existing  territorial  boundaries.  The  far  greater  and  [more]
important  challenge,  in  my view,  is  how to  transcend territory  as  the  basis  for  the
formation of political community.’
13 But what precisely does it mean to speak of ‘transcending’ territory in the early twenty-
first century? Many different answers are possible. To some, a revamped pan-Islamism or
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the arrival of imported Muslim ‘jihadi’ fighters in Kashmir in the 1990s is precisely a form
of transcending territories. To others, vast class-based solidarities that trump borders
and boundaries remain a utopian horizon. Certainly, we know what the major debates on
this question looked like a century ago. On the very eve of the First World War, Vladimir
Lenin famously launched a vigorous polemical attack, centring precisely on the ‘national
question’  and  taking  as  its  principal  target  many of  his  fellow leftists  such  as  Rosa
Luxemburg. The latter had expressed strong scepticism regarding the legitimate role of
any form of nationalism, which she saw as being no more than a cunning political device
of bourgeois interests, to the exclusion of other classes in society. On the other hand,
Lenin—here  making  common  cause  with  Karl  Kautsky  and  some  others—insisted  on
taking  a  ‘realist’  line,  in  which  many  (but  not  all)  national  movements  should  be
supported for strategic reasons. This Leninist doxa was then both a resource and burden
for other Marxist ideologues in the decades that followed. Stalin, participating in the
same  debate,  had  for  his  part  defined  a  nation  as  ‘a  historically  constituted,  stable
community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic
life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’ (Stalin 1950 [1913]) Yet,
neither he nor his direct political successors considered this a sufficient reason to afford
extensive political autonomy—let alone political independence—to the various ‘republics’
that eventually formed a part of the USSR. In a similar fashion, the Communist Party in
post-1949 China did not for the most part believe that the western regions that had only
quite recently been conquered by the Qing merited a place as separate ‘nations’. Indeed,
profiting from the shifting frontier of influence that Qing confrontations with the British
and Russians had produced, Mao Zedong and his supporters even went on to make claims
over regions and peoples over which the Chinese state did not have a deep historical
claim of hegemony or even dominance, let alone a commonality of ‘language, territory,
economic life,  and psychological  make-up’.  In other words,  the USSR and Communist
China have, despite their ostensible claims of loyalty to Leninist and Stalinist dogma, in
fact followed the inertial territorial and expansionist logic of the Tsarist and Qing states
respectively.
14 Yet,  a  hostility  to  considerations  of  territory  still  persists  amongst  certain  sorts  of
Marxist analysts. In a muscular exchange with South Asian historians in the late 1980s,
referred to in collective work South Asia and World Capitalism, the ‘world-systems theorist’
Immanuel Wallerstein declared: ‘South Asia is an invented abstraction (…). And world
capitalism  is  an  extremely  complex  and  dense  historical  phenomenon  which  is  not
merely singular but unique. Nothing could be more concrete, empirical, idiographic than
world capitalism. Nothing could be more abstract, theoretical, nomothetic than South
Asia’  (Bose 1990:  162).  On the face of  it,  this is  a nonsensical  deployment of  Kantian
categories, since Wallerstein’s devotion to the ‘empirical’ is contradicted by practically
every line of his slapdash œuvre. But it can only make sense if we ask by whom South Asia
has allegedly been elevated to the status of the ‘abstract’ and the ‘theoretical’. Here, the
only identifiable culprits are the defenders of a concept of an ‘Indic Civilization’, which
would  provide  the  abstract  essence  of  South  Asia,  of  which  concrete  and  variant
manifestations  are  then identifiable.  On the  other  hand,  most  of  those  who use  the
concept of South Asia in the social sciences today would probably prefer a weaker and
more contingent notion, broadly compatible with Lewis and Wigen’s well-known ‘critique
of meta-geography’ (Lewis & Wigen 1997).
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15 The nation-states that make up the region of South Asia thus respond to a number of
different  principles,  sometimes  evoked  separately  and  sometimes  in  combination.  In
some, such as Sri Lanka and Nepal, a combination of ethnicity, language and religion
provides a power motor for majoritarian nationalism, and a consequent and ever-present
tension with a minority. Despite the fact that the Sri Lankan uplands and lowlands had
never been unified under a single state after 1500,  the brute fact  of  being an island
geography has thus been deployed by Sinhala nationalists—especially in the face of a
dominant  northern neighbour.  In other instances,  such as  Pakistan,  religion alone is
largely meant to suffice—and that too a notion of religion that has become progressively
narrower  and  more  exclusionary  (even  within  the  fold  of  Islam)  in  the  past  seven
decades. Elsewhere, as in Bangladesh, language and religion combine in an effective way,
to ensure that  neither pan-Islamism nor linguistic  nationalism can triumph.  In India
alone, it would seem, an older imperial legacy still plays a significant role, though this is
seldom admitted openly or made a key element in political discourse. Analysts of the
1950s  and  1960s  often  assumed  that  it  was  precisely  this  imperial  dimension  that
rendered the Indian Union fragile and would lead to its break-up over the course of the
second half of the twentieth century. This prediction has proven false, not only for India
but for almost all of the very large, multi-ethnic states that emerged from the Second
World War. But nor has it turned out to be the case that all or most smaller states have
fused to produce larger agglomerations, and the early experiment between Egypt and
Syria (running from 1958 to 1961) has had few if  any successors.  For the foreseeable
future then, a more likely scenario is a continuation of the constellation of highly unequal
states that make up this region, with all their festering resentments and border wounds.
16 How confident can we be then regarding the stability of  South Asia as a concept? A
salutary lesson in this matter is provided to us by a major work from a quarter-century
ago on Southeast Asia. Its author, the New Zealander historian Anthony Reid, begins by
asserting  in  no  uncertain  terms  that  ‘few  major  areas  of  the  world  have  been  so
spectacularly demarcated by nature as has Southeast Asia.’ This specificity is all the more
marked  because  the  region  ‘has  been  relatively  free  from  the  mass  migrations  and
invasions from Central Asia which affected India and China.’ Moreover, Reid states, when
one looks at ‘the popular beliefs and social practices of ordinary Southeast Asians, the
common  ground  becomes  increasingly  apparent.’  This  common  ground  includes
linguistic  elements—the  dominance  of  Austronesian  languages;  what  he  terms
‘adaptation to a common physical environment’, leading to the ‘dominance of rice and
fish in the diet and the small part played by meat and milk products’; the ‘predominance
of forest and water’ which determines patterns of housing; and a variety of other cultural
usages (from the cockfight to the bronze gong) that also apparently give the region both
unity and an air of homogeneity. In this whole seamless pattern extending from Arakan
to Maluku, only Vietnam poses a problem to Reid, on account of its proximity to the
culture  and  lived  environment  of  China.  Yet,  what  of  the  commonalities  between
Myanmar (Burma) and parts of eastern India? Can we indeed assume a robustness to the
concept  of  ‘Southeast  Asia’,  purely  given  by  geography,  and  especially  physical
geography? Even the most  fervent  ideologues of  the ASEAN seem less  sure than the
historian. Striking a far more sceptical note than Reid, I would propose that the macro-
region is never quite a finished product, but one that ever continues to be in-the-making.
The boundaries of the nations that make up South Asia will remain to an extent unsettled,
but so will the limits of South Asia itself—depending on the usage to which it is put. If
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nations are contingent products of political and social negotiations, so too are macro-
regions. 
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